# 1NC

### 1

Topicality

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative should defend the goals of the resolution: prohibition of anticompetitive business practices by the private sector — affirmatives can refuse the methodology of the resolution, but the end point of the 1AC should be the goal of the resolution

**“Prohibition” means to formally forbid.**

**Eaton** et al. **17**, Joseph Van Eaton, Gail Karish, Gerard Lavery Lederer, lawyers for Best Best & Krieger, Llp. Michael Watza, (3-8-2017, KITCH DRUTCHAS WAGNER VALITUTTI & SHERBROOK, “BEFORE THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C”, COMMENTS OF SMART COMMUNITIES SITING COALITION, https://tellusventure.com/downloads/policy/fcc\_row/smart\_communities\_siting\_coaltion\_comments\_mobilitie\_8mar2017.pdf)

2. What are at issue legally are prohibitions and effective prohibitions, and not hindrances, as the Commission seems to suggest in its Notice. The term “prohibit” is not defined in the Act, but it has an ordinary meaning: to formally forbid (something) by law, rule, or other authority; or to “prevent, stop, rule out, preclude, make impossible.” A mere “hindrance” “is simply notin accord withthe ordinaryand fairmeaning” of the term prohibit,104 and can provide no basis for additional Commission intrusions on local authority over wireless facilities. Much of what Mobilitie complains about is a “hindrance” at most (and usually a hindrance magnified by its own actions).

#### Business practices are ongoing and prevalent conduct defined by the behaviors of many profit-based market participants

MacIntosh 97 (KERRY LYNN MACINTOSH-Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A. 1978, Pomona College; J.D. 1982, Stanford University. “LIBERTY, TRADE, AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: WHEN SHOULD DEFAULT RULES BE BASED ON BUSINESS PRACTICES?” *William and Mary Law Review*, vol. 38, no. 4, May 1997, p. 1465-1544. HeinOnline accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 8/27/21)

These new and revised articles reflect a strong trend toward choosing default rules4 that codify existing business practices.5 [[BEGIN FOOTNOTE 5]] 5. In this Article, the term "business practices" is used to refer to practices that emerge over time as countless market participants exercise their freedom to engage in profitable transactions. For an account of the evolution of business practices, see infra Part II. As used here, "business practices" is broader and less technical than "trade usage," which the Code narrowly defines as "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." U.C.C. § 1-205(2). [[END FOOTNOTE 5]] This is particularly true of the recent revisions to Articles 3 (Negotiable Instruments), 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections) and 5 (Letters of Credit).

#### The private sector is for profit entities and excludes non-profits — means the NDT, CEDA, ADA, etc. don’t count, so prohibiting debate practices is NOT topical

PMNCH 10, Patrnership for Maternal & Newborn Health, https://www.who.int/pmnch/about/steering\_committee/B9\_10\_7\_ps\_principles.pdf)

For this study the private sector is defined as: for-profit formal commercial organizations as well as business coalitions or business alliances  Using this definition, private sector includes: a) For-profit commercial enterprises or businesses b) Business coalitions and alliances (cross-industry, multi issues groups; issue-specific initiatives; industry-focused initiatives)

#### They violate — they don’t have a connection to forbidding anticompetitive business practices

#### A predictable limit is the only way to give the neg a chance to win---radical aff choice shifts the grounds for the debate and puts the aff far ahead. Pre-tournament negative preparation is structured around topical plans as points of offense, which means anything other than a topical plan structurally favors the affirmative.

#### First, fairness---debate requires effective competition between the aff and the neg---the only way for any benefit to be produced from debate is if the judge can make a decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to prepare for a common point of debate.

#### Second, contestation---debate is unique because of the iteration of limited arguments over the course of a season that forces debaters to improve their arguments and reconsider their positions. Every debater is here for different reasons, but all those reasons rely the pedagogical uniqueness of the space and maximizing its benefits. Their topic is unilaterally declared and imprecise, which prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing.

### 2

Cap K

#### Camming is work and cannot be disentangled from neoliberalism---it can never be liberatory so long as its transactional

Sanders et al. 20, \*Professor in Criminology at the University of Leicester, \*\*Professor of Sociology at UNLV, \*\*\*Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Nevada [\*Sanders, Teela, \*\*Barbara G. Brents, and \*\*\*Chris Wakefield. Paying for sex in a digital age: US and UK perspectives. Routledge, 2020, pp.300.] mads

But technology is not the sole protagonist in ‘sexual shaping’, and we do not want to present ideas around intimacy in a manner that is uncritical. It must be noted from the outset that any experiences of intimacy may well be asymmetrical in favour of the customer. Despite knowing that sex workers and cammers can enjoy their work and also be sexually stimulated (Gander 2016; Jones 2016; Kontula 2008; Smith 2017), the bottom line is that camming is work, involving a range of sexual, emotional and physical labour (Stuart 2019). The understanding of the potential for intimacy for the customer must be balanced with the understanding that gendered and racialised inequalities mean that certain groups have more need to earn cash in flexible, informal and instant ways. Sexual norms and desires are also gendered and racialised, as predominantly male consumers demand female delivery and facilitation of sex talk, intimate interactions and masturbation over a short period of time and with minimal effort from the consumer. Workers experience labour exploitations, which may range from financial extortion (with high overheads taken from platforms) to hidden forms of sexual exploitation, which are not obvious to the consumer (or to law enforcement for that matter). A critical understanding of the performance of intimacy, as well as its consumption, must be taken, as power dynamics exist in all labour/consumer relationships and perhaps more starkly in ones where sex is being traded. The webcam has become the vehicle that facilitates labour demands and opportunities, and, at the same time, provides a space for sexual behaviour to be uncoupled from traditional formats and patterns found in ‘real-time’ space. This online form of work and consumption means that both labourers/providers and consumers/customers tend to cross over between the online only sex market and the physical sex markets where in-person services are consumed. With this dramatic change in the last decade, it is clear that the supply and demand dynamics will continue to exploit the advances in technology.

#### Digital pornography is driven by surveillance capitalism to mine user-data to maximize efficiency---performances of camming are never resistive but enable the continuation of cyclical labor exploitation---turns the AFF

Keilty 18, Associate Professor in the Faculty of Information and Centre for Sexual Diversity Studies at the University of Toronto [Patrick, 2021, “Desire by design: pornography as technology industry,” Porn Studies, DOI: 10.1080/23268743.2018.1483208] mads

\*contextualize this as a link to the AFF and to the performance

Globally, pornography is a US$97 billion global media industry (Morris 2014). As the primary platform by which people interact with pornography today, online pornography companies wield enormous influence over the ways viewers learn about, play with, explore, and construct sexuality and sexual desire. Each day, tens of millions people visit PornHub, xHamster, and Xvideos, three of the most frequently visited online pornography sites (Alexa 2017). These websites may seem like amateurish distribution services. However, they are sophisticated technology companies that employ hundreds of technical staff to design and develop interfaces, algorithms, data mining software, data analytics software, video streaming software, and database management systems. They are part of an innovative industry engaged in the kinds of algorithmic and data science practices that drive the profits of more widely recognized industries, such as social media, online gambling, online games, search engines, and electronic commerce. These designers are responsible for making strategic choices about information management and the graphical organization of content that translates into large profits, innovative capitalist media techniques, and dominant modes for curating, distributing, and regulating our experience of sexual desire today. Studying the online pornography industry is therefore vital to understanding the contemporary capitalist media landscape. Whereas many pornography studies focus on the representational, labour, or historical aspects of the industry, the technical science of online pornography has gone largely unexamined. The profit motives of the pornography industry have long driven new forms of media and technological innovation, including the development and proliferation of cable television, VCR, Blu-ray, broadband, and 3G mobile services (Tynan 2008). In recent years, the industry has driven the development of web technologies and online business practices, such as hosting services, live chat, secure credit-card processing, banner advertisements, pop-ups, web promotions, mouse-trapping (which prevents users from leaving a site), and streaming video technology (Paasonen 2011). Another influence of this industry manifests through two technical design strategies: first, by structuring and regulating sexual desire through algorithmic categorizations that attempt to softly persuade viewers into continuing to search for an ‘imagined perfect image’; and second, by designing an immersive viewing experience to increase attention retention and ‘time on site’. Examining the pornography industry’s technical design strategies builds upon but is distinct from the emerging fields of study into the ethics of algorithms and values in design. It also makes a contribution to mechanistic understandings of design, which focus on feedback loops that minimize frustration and maximize satisfaction and efficiency. Ultimately, the pornography industry reveals the social and political implications of technical design in our engagements with sexuality, representation, and desire, blurring the line between surveillance and access, design and experience, bodies and capital, and autonomy and automation. By data mining individuals’ browsing habits, the online pornography industry uses ‘algorithmic identities’ (Cheney-Lippold 2011) to mediate sexual categories, to fetishize racial, class, and cultural difference, and to suggest content and advertisements. Importantly, each viewer’s identity is always changeable, based on newly observed behaviour or the input of new metadata. The purpose of this adaptability is to create a capacity of suggestion. That is, to softly persuade viewers to continue searching for an imagined perfect image and to enable repetitive and recursive browsing, encouraging viewers to forgo the pleasures of the known for the pleasures of the unknown. Drawing on both individually generated data and aggregated data in calculating search results, these computer algorithms also track geographic locations, IP addresses, and viewer-generated tags, categories, and video titles. As Evangelos Tziallas explores further in this issue, examining the design of these systems helps us better understand the workings of biopower (i.e. the regulation of individuals through diverse technics of subjugation) at the level of the category, computer code, statistics, and surveillance as a form of interpellation. In this way, the design of pornographic streaming sites works as a disciplinary regime that structures and regulates sexual desire to fit within the context of algorithmic categorization. The collection of browsing data works hand-in-hand with strategic graphic design to increase ‘time on site’ and ‘attention retention’. The longer viewers browse the site, the more data viewers produce. The graphical interface of pornographic video streaming sites reveals the organization of pornographic content as a cultural value system that structures and regulates individuals’ sexual desires. For many proponents of ‘design thinking’ in the field of human–computer interaction, design attempts to map a direct relation between structure and effect. Its goal is to design an environment to maximize efficient accomplishment of tasks by individuals who are imagined as autonomous agents whose behaviours can be constrained in a mechanical feedback loop. Often the assumption is that minimalist design and ease of use are the most effective approach to graphic design (Drucker 2014). Under this assumption, pornographic streaming sites might be seen as a good example of poor graphic design due to their seemingly chaotic nature. Yet the design of these sites is highly strategic: many pornography websites provide an enormous range for selection that seems to promise satisfaction. These sites are designed to keep viewers searching for an imagined perfect image. Following Lacan (1992, 2007), however, nothing compares to an imagined perfect image, leaving every image inadequate. Therefore, viewers forego the pleasures of the known for the pleasures of the unknown. This concept of design participates in an aegis of ‘getting what you want’ but in excess of it. Its intention is to create the technological conditions by which interacting with a pornography website becomes an entry point for immersion. The scripts of the sites’ graphical interfaces preclude certain actions while inviting or demanding others. In this way, designers delegate to technology the task of soliciting and sustaining absorption, or what The Atlantic technology writer Alexis Madrigal (2013) refers to as the ‘Dark Side of Flow’, a reference to the work of Csikszentmihalyi (1994), the psychologist who popularized the term ‘flow’ to describe states of absorption in which attention is so narrowly focused on an activity that a sense of time and the concerns of daily life fade. The graphical interfaces of pornographic video streaming sites create a space of dwelling, wandering, browsing, meandering, or prolonging engagement for the purpose of pleasure, or for keeping boredom at bay, idle distraction, and time squandering. The organization of pornographic video streaming sites lends itself to viewing across modalities, creating a media convergence that includes animation, gifs, live action, graphic design, and sound, to name only a few. In this sense, online pornography is much more mutable than film and video. Viewers immediately engage with multiple media simultaneously when they land on a pornographic video streaming site. PornHub, Xtube, Redtube, YouPorn, Xvideos, and xHamster all feature (not coincidentally) similar interface design: animated gifs in rows and columns, juxtaposed with a distracting live-action advertisement on the right-hand side of the screen. The effect is to draw the viewer’s eye clockwise, beginning with the company’s logo and search box in the upper left-hand corner, across the page to the live-action advertisement, then back to the rows of animated gifs.1 The result is a cyclical viewing pattern that compels viewers to browse the entire space, to ‘take in’ the volume of videos, well known to designers of other consumer spaces, such as supermarkets, department stores, malls, and, perhaps the epitome of this design, Ikea (Penn 2011), Walmart (Underhill 2015), and malls like Toronto’s Eaton Centre (Jameson 1992). These spaces are designed to give viewers routes to follow while distracting them with an abundance of products. In doing so, this mode of design promises satisfaction while delivering unintelligibility and disorientation in order to remove one’s sense of autonomy and intentionality through capital-productive distractions. Live action and gifs function together as an aesthetic contrivance to create a rambling and chaotic sensory overflow. That the images have been arranged in rows and columns ostensibly gives viewers a sense of method and control for navigating the abundance of images. As viewers roll their onscreen cursor over the images, the images flash pixelated clips (gifs/thumbnails) of a longer video to which the images link. The result is an interactive environment in which viewers feel they can control and manipulate images into animation. Yet this sense of interaction also serves to draw the viewer further into a labyrinth of serendipitous discovery. When a viewer clicks on an animated gif, a new webpage opens featuring a live-action clip, alongside a dizzying array of new advertisements and more rows and columns of animated gifs algorithmically determined to ‘relate’ to the featured clip. Viewers are thus presented with an entirely new set of images to navigate. If the featured clip does not fit a viewer’s imagined perfect image, one completely adequate to a viewer’s desire, they are invited to shift to any number of other gifs featured on the page. The process structures pleasure as the delay and deferral of satisfaction through browsing, and incrementally intensifies the elements of surprise. For many of online pornography’s detractors, this analysis might be misunderstood as speaking directly to fears about a lack of control and autonomy of the body when confronted with cyberporn, particularly during the culture wars of the 1990s and the paranoia around internet porn (Chun 2006). These fears manifest in images of what Kipnis (1996, 161) has called the ‘asocial compulsively masturbating misfit’, a sex-obsessed individual whose unwholesomely dissolute body contributes nothing to society but, instead, contributes variously to the destruction of family, morals, and the nation-state.2 Yet my purpose is to intervene in both the materialist tendency to treat technology as an autonomous, determining force as well as human-centred approaches that tend to regard technology as inanimate or neutral. Instead, following Latour (1999), objects and subjects act together through their encounters with each other, a co-production. As a multi-billion-dollar industry, online pornography functions paradoxically as both an ideal of late capitalist production and a source of great cultural anxiety. Through immersive design and data collection, online pornography turns the sexed body over into the service of capital: browsing as labour production. Despite its economic value, expressions of its lack of value abound, particularly when it supposedly threatens the heteronormative reproductive and procreative interests of society. Yet for Bataille (1991), social prohibitions and the transgressions attached to the realm of eroticism have found expression in the ‘uselessness’ of erotic life. According to this logic, it is just the kind of expenditure of excess energy associated with online pornography that demarcates the realm of human autonomy relative to ‘useful’ ends.

#### The 1AC’s presumption of “agency” and “choice” in camming occludes the perspectives of indigenous prostitutions and is an act of colonial violence that permits libertarianism to tame dissent through free market ideals

Murphy 14 (Meghan, freelance writer and journalist with a Masters in Women’s Studies from Simon Fraser University, Feminist Current, “In prostitution, ‘race, class, and sex intersect in the worst of ways to subjugate Native women,” 3-19-14, <http://feministcurrent.com/8771/in-prostitution-race-class-and-sex-intersect-in-the-worst-of-ways-to-subjugate-native-women/>, accessed 12-15-14 //Bosley)

The documentary features women such as Jackie Lynne, Cherry Smiley, Summer-Rain Bentham and Mona Woodward, who describe the ways poverty, racism, sexism, and violence lead indigenous women into prostitution and keep them there. “Race, class, and sex intersect in the worst ways to subjugate Native women — and in the act of prostitution it’s the most racist, the most sexist… And the man holds all of the economic power in that,” Lynne says. Indigenous women and girls are overrepresented in street prostitution and are, according to Cherry Smiley, the most affected, yet she says in the documentary that the recent judgement on Bedford vs. Canada left them out of the decision. “There was no mention of colonialism in the judgement, there was no mention of aboriginal women and girls in the judgement,” she said. Smiley says the voices, experiences, knowledge and traditions of indigenous women have been silenced and ignored in this case. This, of course, speaks to a larger pattern we see wherein certain voices are privileged in conversations around prostitution, as well as to Canadian society’s general treatment and view of indigenous people. Woodward says that when her sister died just outside of Calgary, the police didn’t even bother to do an investigation. “Society, as a whole, does not care about aboriginal women,” she says. “And they certainly don’t care about sex trade workers, if you’re aboriginal and you’re poor.” And so while we seem to revel in the stories of white, educated, middle class women who entered into prostitution, perhaps of their own volition, who can fit the role of “happy hooker” and placate our desire to believe that, “oh, it’s not so bad,” “it’s natural,” “it’s just a job like any other,” the voices of the women most impacted are silenced and erased. We desperately want prostitution to be simply about consenting adults engaging in fun sexy times, no big deal. What we don’t want is to address are the larger issues around who ends up in prostitution and why. We also don’t want to deal with the fact that, behind all this — behind the existence of the entire sex industry — are men who want the “right” to have whatever they want. And I say “whatever” rather than “whomever” because it seems clear that men who buy sex (especially the men who buy sex from indigenous women and girls on the Downtown Eastside) don’t particularly want to think about the humanity of the women and girls they are using. What’s behind prostitution and the men who buy sex, I’m told by sisters and allies like Trisha Baptie, is that men want someone to whom they can do the things their wives and girlfriends won’t let them. Meaning that they want someone who they don’t have to think of as a full human being. As indigenous women have been historically dehumanized, it’s no surprise that society and johns would choose them to be the discardable humans, offered up to violent men as the rest of us look away. What we also don’t like to talk about are the cycles of abuse Woodward and Lynne discuss — the way indigenous girls are abused in their homes and how that leads them into prostitution. Nor do we like to discuss the ways in which prostitution is a deeply racist industry, as Bentham points out. “We’re targeted from the time when we’re small and taught that it’s an option for us. We’re taught that our bodies aren’t actually ours but that they are to please men,” Bentham says. The comments that stood in most in contrast to what we hear from many of the indigenous women featured in the documentary came from Kate Gibson, executive director of WISH, who talked about the “agency” and “choice” of women who enter into the sex industry. While she claims “women can decide whether or not they’re going to engage in sex work,” it seems that the reality is that real “choice” and “agency” is what many women don’t have. “While we might not think that sex work is really a viable or safe alternative for women, that’s not our decision to make. It is their decision to make,” Gibson adds. Is it? Is it really “their decision to make” when we as a society have taken so much from indigenous people, forced girls and women into homes with abusers and then pushed them onto the streets, then abandoned them with few alternatives or resources, left them vulnerable to predators, and then looked away as they are murdered and go missing? Is it really fair to say, “well it’s their decision” within that context? Is it really a “safe alternative?” If we believe that, it seems we aren’t listening. Gibson says that up to 57% of women who use the WISH drop-in center are aboriginal (despite the fact that they make up only 2-4% of the population in Canada). What does this tell us about “women’s choices?” If prostitution were just a great “choice” women just happen to make, wouldn’t more middle class white women would be doing it? Or maybe men? Why is it that those people don’t “choose” prostitution? The rhetoric of “free choice and agency” reeks of free market capitalism and delusion. Smiley points out that “when we decriminalize pimps and johns or when we move towards a legalized regime of prostitution… we’re putting all of our faith and hope in capitalism.” “We’re hoping that that greed will somehow regulate itself and we’re hoping that somehow pimps and johns will all of a sudden decide they want to put women’s equality before profit and before dollars,” she says.

#### Their politics of individualized micro-practices fractures the necessary political condensation required to overthrow capital

Jodi Dean 15, Professor of Political Theory at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2015, “Red, Black, and Green,” Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 396-404

A defining characteristic of capitalism is the differentiation between state and economy.2 More than an economic system for the production and circulation of value, capitalism refers to a form of society (Marx 2008, 14). In contrast with, say, feudalism, capitalist society relies on the differentiation of the economic system from the political system. That state and economy are differentiated does not mean that they are separate from one another. States are deeply involved in economic life: they issue and maintain currencies, create and preserve property and markets, devise and extend the policy infrastructure of global trade, and so on. The differentiation between state and economy also does not imply complete independence, as if states themselves were not economic actors with, for example, massive purchasing, employing, and investing power. Rather, under capitalism the differentiation between state and economy points to different relations to capital accumulation, with the state focused generally on the terms and conditions of accumulation and the economy focused on the circulatory processes of accumulation itself.

Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2012, 4) speak of the “relative autonomy” of capitalist states. Political logics, rationalities, or governmentalities (to use Foucault’s term) are irreducible to economic considerations. Capitalist states have capacities to act on behalf of the system as a whole—capacities anchored in an array of institutions, laws, and policies. At the same time, they are constrained by their dependence on capital accumulation. States secure and reproduce capitalism, whether by protecting capitalists from themselves through taxes and regulatory oversight, protecting capitalists from the people through aggressive policing and surveillance, or protecting people from capitalists in those increasingly frequent emergency responses that have taken the place of planning and social welfare.

The state—particularly in its contemporary extended, decentralized, and networked form—gives capitalism its durability. It responds to capitalism’s inevitable crises, keeping the system running even when its components break down. Under globalized capitalism, an international policy architecture aimed at securing capital flow provides massive advantages to multinational banks and corporations. The structural adjustment policies and austerity measures imposed by the IMF, World Bank, European Central Bank, and U.S. Treasury determine (although not fully or exclusively) the lives of billions of people, impacting basic social structures such as education and medical care, property, markets for agricultural products, transportation, currency value, energy, and the availability of potable water. The viability of communism, as an egalitarian political and economic arrangement anchored in the sovereignty of the people and in production based on need, depends on seizing, dismantling, or redirecting this system.

Naomi Klein (2014, 66–9) tells a story that illustrates the limits the global trade architecture imposes on local actors. In 2009, the Canadian province of Ontario announced the Green Energy and Green Economy Act. Its goal was to shift Ontario away from dependence on coal. As Klein explains, “The legislation created what is known as a feed-in tariff program, which allowed renewable energy providers to sell power back to the grid.” A key element of the plan was ensuring that “local municipalities, co-ops, and Indigenous communities could all get into the renewable energy market” (67). This was to be achieved by a provision requiring that a certain percentage of materials and workforce come from Ontario. Although there were various setbacks and complications, after several years the legislation seemed to have been largely successful. That’s when Japan and the EU went to the World Bank with the complaint that the local materials and workforce requirement discriminated against equipment producers outside Ontario. The World Bank agreed; the buy local provisions were illegal.

The absence of a powerful Left enables the political Right (in part by shifting what had been the center). The intensified inequality of the last forty years of neoliberalism testifies to the impact of left political defeat.3 Neoliberalism’s subjection of all of society to its economic criteria of efficiency and competitiveness has been carried out as a political project.4 The political system has been the instrument through which neoliberalism has dismantled the achievements of the welfare state, installed competition in ever more domains, expanded the finance sector, and imposed austerity.

This is the setting, then, for my appeal to the Left to assemble itself into a party. Key determinants of our lives occur behind our backs—currency valuations, monetary policies, trade agreements, energy concessions, data harvesting. To insist on a politics focused on isolating and archiving singular micropractices abstracted from their global capitalist context obscures the workings of state and economy as a capitalist system, hinders the identification of this system as the site of ongoing harm (exploitation, expropriation, and injustice), and disperses political energies that could be more effective if concentrated. More fundamentally, in treating economic practices as the primary locus of left politics, such an insistence effaces the gap between politics and economics such that questions of strategy, of how to win, are displaced. Morrow and Brault supply a striking example of this effacement when they ask, “What is communism for, if not to improve our everyday lives?” Communism, which previous generations rendered as the world-historical struggle of the proletariat, diminishes into yet another option for individual self-improvement; the abolition of exploitation, expropriation, and injustice replaced by economic determinations of immediate satisfaction. As Ramsey rightly notes, Healy similarly substitutes economic alternatives for political antagonism.

Two ideas voiced in the present discussion impress the urgency of the need for a left party oriented toward communism: racism (Buck 2015) and the Anthropocene (Healy 2015).

Given anthropogenic climate change, the stakes of contemporary politics are almost unimaginably high. They range from the continued investment in extractive industries and fossil fuels constitutive of the carbon-combustion complex (see Oreskes and Conway 2014), to the dislocations accompanying mass migration in the wake of floods and droughts to the racist response of states outside what Christian Parenti (2011, 9) calls the “Tropic of Chaos” (the band around the “belt of economically and politically battered post-colonial states girding the planet’s mid-latitudes,” where climate change is “beginning to hit hard”), all the way to human extinction. That one city, state, or country brings carbon emissions under control—while certainly a step in the right direction—may be irrelevant from the standpoint of overall warming. Perhaps its carbon-emitting industries were shipped elsewhere. Perhaps another country chose to expand its own drilling operations. Climate change forces us to acknowledge that we can’t build new worlds (Helepololei). We live in one world, the heating up of which threatens humans and other species. Not all communities, economies, or ways of life are compatible. Those premised on industries and practices that continue to contribute to planetary warming have to change significantly, and soon. Forcing that change is the political challenge of our time.

Given the persistence of racialized violence and the operation of the state as an instrument for the maintenance not only of capitalist modes of production but also and concomitantly of racialized hierarchy, the challenges of organizing politically across issues and identities are almost insurmountably daunting. No wonder the Left resorts to moralism and self-care instead. It’s easier to catalog difference than it is to build up a Left strong enough to exercise power, especially given the traversal of state power by transnational corporations, trade, and treaties. It’s also easier to go along with the dominant ideology of individualism, which enjoins us first and foremost to look after ourselves, than it is to put ourselves aside and focus on formulating a strategy for using collective power to occupy, reconfigure, and redirect institutions at multiple levels. Here again, not every vision of community is compatible with every other. Those premised on fantasies of racial, religious, ethnic, or linguistic purity directly oppose those premised on diversity. Those premised on reproducing structures of class hierarchy directly oppose those insisting on equality.

If something like a party of the radical Left can stretch beyond Greece and Spain, if it can be imagined in North America, it will only be possible as a combination of communism, antiracism, and climate activism. I use “red, black, and green” as a heuristic for the coalition of concerns necessary for such a party. I invoke the heuristic here to double down against critics who prefer a thousand alternatives to the party form. A thousand alternatives (see Healy 2015) is no alternative. It leaves the political system we have—the one that puts all its force behind the preservation of capitalist class interests—intact. Some ideas need to be chosen, systematized into a program, and defended.

#### A politics of affective queerness is complicit within capitalism --- subjectivities are a result of capitalist structures --- biopolitical approaches that operate at the level of subject or community building fails to restructure production relations and only naturalizes capitalism.

Alyson ESCALANTE 11. “Gender Nihilism: An Anti-Manifesto.” Selections on Gender Nihilism. Presented at the Crisis Conference. <https://viscerapvd.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/gendernihilism.pdf>.

There is a failure of understanding here in the belief that the absence of an immediate exchange of money qualifies something as non-commercial or anti-capitalist. The simple fact that one is not paid for one’s labor is not enough to disqualify it from being labor. A great deal of labor, perhaps even the majority, is unwaged. An wide array of unpaid work has been subsumed so as to still produce a great deal of value. One isn’t paid to update their Facebook profile. No licensing in existence can truly exempt something from the market. Where she says “distribution to create radical queer community” we can read “investment in the creation of new radical queer markets.” These techniques of self-production can be as queer or as radical as possible, this will only cement their position as the avant-garde of capital. She goes on: I am interested in an experimental, materialist, affective approach to epistemology or meaning. I am approaching SIS as a concrete exploration of the possibilities of porn production, as a form of biopolitical resistance, and as an attempt to apply open source methodologies to cultural production with my own body and emotions. It is unclear what is meant here by ‘biopolitical resistance.’ Porn is clearly a biopolitical terrain: a zone of the deployment of power that works to construct human subjectivity and sexuality. Where Micha goes astray is in only conceiving of power a top-down operation, as purely normative. The sexual practices portrayed in her porn, however radical they may be, are just as constructed and constructing as the dominant practices found in any other porn. If we are to read this as “biopolitical resistance” then we are naming as resistance what is simply the status quo functioning of pornography: to produce and discipline the sexual desires of its viewers. Changing the imagery does not change these productive forms of control. Beyond this, the application of open-source methodologies to cultural production is simply descriptive of cultural production as it already functions. Social media is the perfect example of the way in which our bodies and our emotions are put in the service of production thorough “open source methodologies.” She continues: With respect to oppression of subaltern identities, non-oppressive porn that does not ‘contain’ oppression is not enough. SIS strives to make anti-oppression porn that challenges the institutions of oppression along lines of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Similarly with capitalism, I still harbor hope of making anti-capitalist porn that challenges the existence of capitalism. Micha’s ambitions become increasingly dubious as we go on. No such cultural production, however “anti-oppressive” its content, can escape the fundamentally oppressive structure of the institution. It is still reliant on mediated production, distribution and consumption of sexuality. It is disseminated through material channels of dead labor based on real exploitation. A strong argument can be made that any gesture to integrate or assimilate marginalized groups into structurally flawed forms only acts to legitimate the form itself. We remain alienated regardless of the flavor of the now vindicated alienation. Secondly, to even evaluate the form in a vacuum, one must question what it means to be antioppressive in nature, especially when “anti-oppression” has become just another label to increase the value of any commodity: people still pay thousands to attend anti-oppression classes and academics use the trendiest brand of identity politics to sell books and fill rosters. The consumption of anti-oppressive porn is in no way intrinsically anti-capitalist. In fact, it is merely pioneering the way for pornographers to market a new brand of sexual commodities to the most discerning ethical consumers. One needn’t search too hard on Google to realize that this is already the situation.

Their post-structuralist account of resistance is just bourgeoisie individualism---celebration of flux and temporary ruptures displaces mass organization

---rejection of telos is the link---need to be organizing principles/identities for political movement formation

Jodi Dean, professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, *The Communist Horizon*, ‘12

The boundaries to what can be thought as politics in certain segments of the post-structuralist and anarchist Left only benefit capital. Some activists and theorists think that micropolitical activities, whether practices of self-cultivation or individual consumer choices, are more important loci of action than large-scale organized movement-an assumption which adds to the difficulty of building new types of organizations because it makes thinking in terms of collectivity rarer, harder, and seemingly less "fresh." Similarly, some activists and theorists treat aesthetic objects and creative works as displaying a political potentiality missing from classes, parties, and unions. This aesthetic focus disconnects politics from the organized struggle of working people, making politics into what spectators see. Artistic products, whether actual commodities or commodified experiences, thereby buttress capitalas they circulate political affects while displacing political struggles from the streets to the galleries. Spectators can pay (or donate) to feel radical without having to get their hands dirty. The dominant class retains its position and the contradiction between this class and the rest of us doesn't make itself felt as such. The celebration of momentary actions and singular happenings-the playful disruption, the temporarily controversial film or novel-works the same way. Some on the anarchist and post-stmcturalist Left treat these flickers as the only proper instances of a contemporary left politics. A pointless action involving the momentary expenditure of enormous effort-the artistic equivalent of the 5k and 10k runs to fight cancer, that is to say, to increase awareness of cancer without actually doing much else-the singular happening disconnects task from goal. Any "sense" it makes, any meaning or relevance it has, is up to the spectator (perhaps with a bit of guidance from curators and theorists). Occupation contrasts sharply with the singular happening. Even as specific occupations emerge from below rather than through a coordinated strategy, their common form-including its images, slogans, terms, and practices-links them together in a mass struggle. The power of the return of communism stands or falls on its capacity to inspire large-scale organized collective struggle toward a goal. For over thirty years, the Left has eschewed such a goal, accepting instead liberal notions that goals are strictly individual lifestyle choicesor social-democratic claims that history already solved basic problems of distribution with the compromise of regulated markets and welfare statesa solution the Right rejected and capitalism destroyed. The Left failed to defend a vision of a better world, an egalitrarian world of common production by and for the collective people. Instead, it accommodated capital**,** succumbing to the lmes of individualism, consumerism, competition, and privilege, and proceeding as if there really were no alternative to states that rule in the interests of markts Marx expressed the basic principle of the alternative over a hundred years ago: from each according to ability, to each according to need. This principle contains the urgency of the struggle for its own realization. We don't have to continue to live in the wake of left failure, stuck in the repetitions of crises and spectacle. In light of the planetary climate disaster and the ever-intensifying global class war as states redistribute wealth to the rich in the name of austerity, the absence of a common goal is the absence of a future (other than the ones imagined in post-apocalyptic scenarios like Mad Max). The premise of communism is that collective determination of collective condi tions is possible, **if we want it.**

#### Racial capitalism outweighs — Capitalism necessitates super-exploitation of the Global South, colonial dispossession, militaristic imperialism, and racial hierarchies to sustain itself. The system must be rejected on ethical grounds.

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Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization.

Footnote 14: Another feature of modern U.S. racial capitalism is property by dispossession. In Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory, Robert Nichols draws on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand to theorize how the “system of landed property” was fundamentally predicated on violent dispossession. While the Anglo-derived legal-political regimes differed in these localities, the “intertwined and co-constitutive” material effects converged in the legalized theft of indigenous territory amounting in “approximately 6 percent of the total land on the surface of Earth.” Such dispossession, Nichols notes, is recursive: “In a standard formulation one would assume that ‘property’ is logically, chronologically, and normatively prior to ‘theft.’ However, in this (colonial) context, theft is the mechanism and means by which property is generated: hence its recursivity. Recursive dispossession is effectively a form of property-generating theft.” As such, theft and dispossession, through property regimes, are an ongoing feature of the Indigenous reality of modern U.S. racial capitalism. Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 50–51.

Footnote 15: Borrowing from Karl Marx’s dictum that the labor process is the hidden abode of the capitalist production of value, and Nancy Fraser’s conceptualization of reproduction as the even more hidden abode, or background condition, for the possibility of capitalist production, I understand Blackness as the obfuscated abode. The immense value of Blackness is obscured and rendered unintelligible by its positioning as worthlessness, as something that does not amount to anything—but that does not equal nothing. As a structural location at the intersection of indispensability and disposability, Blackness exceeds the category of race, is not reducible to class, and does not fit the specifications of caste.

My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership.17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus:

By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19

Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21

Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24

Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism.

Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”29

Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism.

The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33

Although Robinson draws on scholars like Fernand Braudel, Henri Pirenne, David Brion Davis, and Eli Heckscher to understand European history, socialist theory, and the European working class, the work of Black Marxists like James Ford, Walter Rodney, Amílcar Cabral, and Paul Robeson offer me those same intellectual, historical, and theoretical resources. Finally, I agree with Alexander that the resolution to racial capitalism is antiracist socialism, not a cultural-metaphysical Black radical tradition.

In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism.

War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat.

#### The alternative is a national, unified Communist Party. Dual power organizing through a party can mobilize marginalized communities, hold members accountable, and unify local struggles with a movement for international liberation.

**Escalante 18**, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. (Alyson, 9/18/18, “Party Organizing in the 21st Century,” *The Forge News*, <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/> Date Accessed: 8/6/2021)

The Need For A Party:

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement.

My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States.

One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them.

The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed.

The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base?

Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing.

By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism.

Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus.

Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing.

Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions.

We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring.

What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal.

In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends.

The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself.

It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.

Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism.

The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion.

I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

#### The alt solves the AFF and is the only option for queer trans liberation---the alternative theorizes queer and trans oppression through materialism and the political economy, anything else falls into TERF traps that alienate trans people and make liberation impossible

Escalante 18 [Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist "Marxism And Trans Liberation". 2018. Medium. <https://medium.com/@alysonescalante/marxism-and-trans-liberation-1066d09b7e8f>.] mads

For Unity and Liberation While it is clear that only the struggle for communism can lead to trans liberation, Marxists have often failed to adequately welcome and protect their trans comrades from internal reactionary forces who would attempt to continue to marginalize trans people within Marxist organizations themselves. Marxist parties have often not only failed to adequately theorize the oppression of trans people, but have embraced socially reactionary positions on trans womanhood in particular. Especially in the UK, Marxist parties have often adopted the TERF line which denounces transgender individuals as antifeminist and in opposition to the collective liberation of women. As a result of the actions of reactionary parties like Communist Party of Great Britain (ML), many trans people have been pushed away from Marxism and have turned elsewhere to find support. The DSA and other social democratic groups have a large trans support base. Various unorganized anarchists factions also have broad appeal among trans people. All of the supporters of these ideologies could be potential comrades in the struggle to establish socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, but Marxists have failed to demonstrate support for trans comrades. When trans people see Marxists explicitly attacking them, or choosing to remain silent in the face of such attacks, the revolutionary left suffers a great loss. The task for Marxists going forward has to be twofold. First, Marxists must publicly and thoroughly denounce anti-trans sentiment as not only reactionary, but as bourgeois ideology used to ensure capitalist social relations will be maintained. This must be public and at the forefront of Marxist organizing. Second, Marxists must take seriously the task of theorizing trans oppression and laying it out in materialist terms. Marxist theorists must continue to elaborate the necessary relationship between capitalist political economy and the oppression of trans people. These two combined actions may not be sufficient to create total unity between trans individuals and Marxists more broadly, but they provide a concrete path forward for creating such unity that is currently lacking.

### Case

#### Opacity turn: Strategies of representation increases anti-queer violence

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Clocking

If, for some, gender only functions in a moment of negative equivalence that produces and does not simply echo what is assumed to appear in the social, what, then, might representation offer for a trans visual culture that resides on the side of flourishing? Or, what remains of the possibility of a liberatory moving image if the medium is moored to the conditions of collective detention? As I outlined in the introduction, mainstream lgbt organizations often argue for casting actors whose identities match their roles and, somewhat less common, for funding lgbt directors and crew to control the means of producing their own images. While these are necessary interventions, nevertheless, there is no guarantee that these adjustments will produce anything less dependent or more radically transformative. The representational regime I’ve been describing is an impasse where a diagnostic is easier to imagine than a corrective by way of speculative prescription. Rather than believing we might be able to “solve” the problem of the image; the charge might be to hold this contraction in the interval of freedom. 49

As is clear, representation has been produced as the primary site of struggle over diversity in the United States from at least the middle of the last century to our current moment. Positive representation, as a visual common sense, traffics normativity’s drive but with a decorative adornment that announces itself as departure. Even with little evidence of its ability to yield a more livable world, positive representation is still offered as the remedy for the years of degraded images that are the history of film. This substitutional logic, where representational change is argued to be analogous to structural change, provides positive representation as both remedy for and evidence of domination’s inevitable end— the promise of equality fulfilled. This respectable image, where neoliberal ideas of economic maturity and proper individualism transpose the stunning disturbances of gender, racial, and sexual excess to the failures of our insolvent past, reconfirm the idea of our progression. Yet this assimilatory representation is another impossibility, a disciplining intent on exiling pleasure and abundance, while ensuring hostile images are as much in our future as they might belong to the present. 50

For example, the last decade has witnessed a vast proliferation of trans representations that are offered as cure to the relentless economic, psychic, affective, and physical violence many trans people endure. These expanding representations are used to undergird dominant culture’s argument that progress is inevitably unfolding. Yet, returning to CeCe McDonald’s words that begin this chapter, we know that with this increased representation comes sustained or heightened instances of violence. While 2014 was named the “Transgender Tipping Point” by Time magazine, each consecutive year since has counted record numbers of murdered trans women of color in the United States. 51 Among our tasks is to attend to the grim reality that the expansion of even “positive” representation might not have simply a neutral corollary to violence but perhaps a causal one as well. 52

Marsha P. Johnson makes a similar argument about visibility and violence after a 1972 Arthur Bell interview in the Village Voice . Referring to a previously published piece, she suggested that the attention brought to the “girlies” (other gender-­ nonconforming sex workers) increased their harassment and led to their arrest later that week. Linguistic representation in the form of the article produced a broader social understanding of Johnson and her friends, including the geographies and temporalities they lived within which put them more centrally on the police’s radar. We have, then, the contradiction of the representational in that it brings us into the world, while also having the capacity to take us out. Here, the distinction (as contradistinction) between being and nonbeing also maps recognition’s fugitivity. 53

Again, rather than an opening toward recognition— a position where one can make a claim instead of exclusively being claimed— representation for Marsha P. Johnson and Duanna Johnson was the prefiguration of their undoings. Duanna Johnson’s being read as trans led to her initial arrest under “suspicion of prostitution,” a policing practice often referred to as “walking while trans,” in which trans women of color are assumed to always be engaging in sex work when they exist in public. Johnson being clocked, or being brought into the general field of representation as negative equality, led to her subsequent beating in the booking room, and perhaps even her murder.

Being clocked, or being seen as trans, is most readily deployed against a person’s identity as an attempt to destroy their/our coherence. Clocking adheres with the gripping force of catastrophe by recasting the violent act of misgendering as the ability to name the Other out of existence. Misgendering here is not a minor act of miscalculation but a way to reclaim the domain of gender and one’s position as author for those who are most threatened by its fragility. Officer McRae’s “he-­she” and “faggot,” the lacerating words intent on obliteration, enacts the double bind of recognition: being seen by the other brings you into the world— into the field of visibility. But for those already on the edges of vitality, like Duanna Johnson, it is often that which also takes you out of it. Through representation— both the cctv video and descriptions of Johnson in court— the defense was able to produce a reversal of guilt, where the party harmed is, via the magic of the law, transformed into the assumed aggressor. Johnson, and not the state, is made to hold the burden of proof— the surveillant gaze in action. 54

Tracing the racial and gendered parameters of recognition from Fanon and da Silva to Snorton and McDonald, how might we reorient the project of recognition, its prohibitions and its access, toward the nondialectical and nondevelopmental? Or, where might relief be found if we abandon the telos of the assumed subject to come? The brutal scene of Duanna Johnson’s beating, replayed against the composed testimony of the court, reminds us that recognition is not a smooth space of inevitability, even in struggle. Here, it’s the phenomenology of violence that compels us beyond a substitutive logic where life, and life’s recognition, is equally distributed.

Fanon turns our attention to the limits of recognition in the colonial context that I more fully explored in chapter 1. By holding on to the dialectics of structure, he also maintains the teleology of subjectivity, even for those deemed nonsubjects. For Fanon, revolutionary violence offers a way through the totalizing constriction of coloniality, the possibility to move from object to subject, however contingent. Given this, how might we push further on Fanon for those who must remain, even in the postcolony, as da Silva might suggest, “no-­bodies against the state”? This is perhaps an unfair question to levy against Fanon’s thought. Yet this “no-­ body” as nonidentity, or the negation of the negation of identity— not unlike Spillers’s caution against “joining the ranks of gendered femaleness”—might offer “the insurgent ground as female social subject.” 55

#### Narratives turn: Making the ballot a referendum on the inclusion of identity in debate is violent

Tuck & Yang 14   
(Eve Associate Professor of Educational Foundations and Coordinator of Native American Studies @ the State University of New York at New Paltz, and K. Wayne Assistant Professor in the Ethnic Studies Department @ UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research”, <https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf>)

Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that educational research and much of social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change1 as both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality, and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken. Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. (p. 343). Hooks’ words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” (hooks, 1990, p. 343).

#### Their rejection of politics creates complacency and homonormativity. Political action doesn’t require embracing it, but it’s key to creating a queer concrete utopia

Duggan and Munoz 10, Lisa Duggan is a Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis at New York University, and Jose Estaban Munoz is an associate professor and department chair of performance studies at New York University, “Hope and hopelessness: A dialogue”, chapter (pages 281-283) “Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory”, [2/20/2020], <https://doi.org/10.1080/07407700903064946> /EH

Lisa: Indeed. Hope is a risk. But I worry that we understate the full effects and meaning of that little word, risk. The hope we invest in our experimental forms, when bad sentiments lead us out of the ossified structures that constrain us, offers us no guarantee. Our experimental forms fail. We experiment under the conditions of life now – the material conditions of housing, health care and work and the emotional conditions of our own past and present intimacies created and broken. How do we transform and escape the conditions of neoliberal privatization and our own ‘‘family’’ histories? What happens to educated hope and concrete utopian thinking when we discover we’ve fucked up, we’ve been wrong, we’ve failed to cope with what we must deal with? What happens when we take the risk of hope and land flat on our faces, alone, abandoned and lost? Especially those of us who seek meaningful work outside the corporate form, or live beyond the limits of the normative couple? Those among us who forsake ossified modes of security, or who simply cannot enlist them for ourselves, take terrifying risks every day. Bad sentiments, pursued as escape, can lead to isolation, poverty and death. So there is fear attached to hope – hope understood as a risky reaching out for something else that will fail, in some if not all ways. What are the resources, then, for an educated hope that comprehends inherent risk and fear? What are the most reliable building blocks for, and the sturdiest bridges to, concrete utopias? I think these might be found in modes of expansive sociality that generate energy from shared collectivity. Expansive, innovative socialities produce energy for alternative, cooperative economies and participatory politics – because as we know, these can be exhausting even if not defined as ‘‘work.’’ Particularly as a basis for queer hope, loving, fucking and socializing otherwise constitute a practice that moves us toward Feeling Revolutionary, in our economic and political as well as (overlapping) intimate lives. Surely gay respectability politics and the sentimentality of the citizen who only wants to be ‘‘good,’’ now dominant on the US political landscape, do not lead us anywhere else, but only into the moribund institutions that deaden the body politic (marriage, the military). So bad sentiments can lead us (instead) out of dominant, alienating social forms, like alienated labor and the gendered family, and into a collectivity of the cynical, bitter, hostile, despairing and hopeless. This is how I find my people! Can these communities of the politically embittered then lead us, not necessarily down the slippery slope to entropy, but into a generatively energetic revolutionary force? Well, can they? If we cling to what Melanie Klein calls the paranoid schizoid position, perhaps not (see Klein 1975). In that infantile place, we reject the bad breast/world for frustrating us and cling to our impossible wishes for oral/political fulfillment, delivered under conditions we can control. One way of grasping the basis for embittered community is to see it as the political solidarity of the paranoid schizoid. And that’s not a bad thing. Regression to infantile intensities and demands can be vitalizing, can help us throw off the moribund maturities demanded by conventional social forms. Such regressions can operate as queer temporalities of anti-development and refusals of normative, Oedipal maturity. The paranoid schizoid pleasures can be considerable, and productive. But they can also lead to forms of anti-relationality, to anti-sociality, to queer refusals that go nowhere else in the world. Klein’s depressive position, if understood not as an achievement of developmental maturity, but as a sideways move out of an impasse (thank you to Kathryn Stockton), can lead (perhaps) to educated hope, to concrete utopia within the social realm.4 From the depressive position we accept the uncontrollable nature of political reality, we critique the social world but still engage it, we take the risk of hope with full knowledge of the possibility, even the certainty, of failure. We repair our relation to the social and political world that we have also wished to mutilate, explode, destroy. We campaign for Obama, then organize to pressure and transform the political institutions that disappoint or harm us. It hurts me to write a sentence as conventional as the previous one, as if I were an advocate of Rorty-style pragmatism, when my Facebook page describes me as an anti-normotic anarcho-socialist! This is the point at which I find the sideways move so crucial. Queer vitality, Feeling Revolutionary, may require that we straddle the Kleinian paranoid schizoid and depressive positions, escaping and re-entering the scene of educated hope in a contrapuntal dance, moving always sideways, never growing ‘‘up.’’ Can we summarize so far by simply and clearly pointing out that the neoliberal state and economy organize compulsory sociality through alienating institutions of work and politics? Noting that the related institutions of marriage and the family organize intimacy and sociality into domesticity and competitive consumption by regulating and constraining our intimate and social energies. Breaking out requires negative energetic force. That force threatens isolation, pain, poverty, prison and death, and it can also lock an embittered community into a romanticized embrace of the negative, a version of the paranoid schizoid position, producing (among other things) versions of what has been called the queer anti-social thesis.5 But that force can also lay the basis for a sideways step into political engagement

[marked]

in a disappointing world, via the educated hope, the concrete utopia, about which Jose´ has been so eloquent. This all leads me to postulate that hope and hopelessness exist in a dialectical rather than oppositional relation, and that the opposite of hope is complacency – a form of happiness that will not risk the consequences of its own suppressed hostility and pain.6 And complacency is the affect of homonormativity. Engaged anti-normative left queer politics is powered by the pleasures of bitterness, cynicism and pain, as well as by ecstasy, empathy and solidarity. But it gestures always necessarily through hope to the concrete utopias forged in our experimental intimacies and social forms. Hope is the primary way we bring ourselves to take the risk of breaking out of the constraints of present conditions. Hope is the energy we use to smash, not depression (grief, sadness, despair, hostility, anger and bitterness) but complacency in all its protean disguises. Jose´: When we talk about this dialectical tension between hope and hopelessness we must account for the force of the negative. But we don’t mean the negative in some grandiose subjectivity-shattering way. We mean living with the negative and that, first and foremost, means living with failure. This is to say that hopelessness and hope converge at a certain point. And we must then face reality in the form of an oftentimes disappointing world. Here is where we depart from some other queer writers and thinkers who write about abandonment to the negative and a subsequent rejection or evasion of politics. Queerness might signal a certain belonging through and with negativity. Often experimental intimacies falter. But those failures and efforts to fail have a certain value despite their ends. In this way we are calling for a politics oriented towards means and not ends. Klein described the depressive position as the only ethical one. But as Lisa indicates we cannot discount the importance of the paranoid schizoid positions and its pleasures – its negative force as an anti-normative resource for queer existence. Klein’s substitution of positions for Freud’s developmentally rigid stages lets us imagine the queer temporal choreography that Lisa describes. W.R. Bion’s notion of valence might also be useful to understand how a belonging in and through affective negativity works for an anti-normative politics (see Bion 1991). Valency, borrowed from chemistry, is the concept that describes the capacity for spontaneous and instinctive emotional combination, between two individuals or a group. Bion’s concept provides a provisional and partial account of how emotions cement social groups as guiding basic assumptions (what he calls bas). Thus as a group or a pair we share happiness and grief, ecstasy and sorrow, and so forth. This affective commonality is a site for commonality and even sociality. When we started this writing project it seemed like most folks assumed that we would be writing about ‘‘hope vs hopelessness’’ or at the very least ‘‘hope or hopelessness.’’ But as this collaborative project progressed it became clear to us that the most important word in our title was the conjunction ‘‘and.’’ Lisa began this dialogue by recounting a story a friend told her. In many ways friendship is the condition of possibility for this writing. Lisa and I share a certain emotional valency and we are part of a larger circuit of friends who also share shifting basic assumptions (for our purposes here, queer feelings). We write for and from an ‘‘and’’ in the hopes to better describe actually existing and potential queer worlds that thrive with, through and because of the negative.

#### Their first author, Penny Griffin concludes neg—they advocate the structural changing of institutions of finance

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### Overview

#### Capitalism is the root cause of heteronormativity and the alternative provides the best analytical tools to solve it

Sears 13 Alan Sears (Sears is the author of, among other works, "Queer in a Lean World" and “Queer Anti-Capitalism: What's Left of Lesbian and Gay Liberation?” and co-author with James Cairns of The Democratic Imagination) interviewed by Andrew Sernatinger & Tessa Echeverria (Andrew Sernatinger and Tessa Echeverria are socialists based in Madison, Wisconsin. This interview was recorded for their podcast, Black Sheep Radio); November 6, 2013; Queering Socialism: An Interview with Alan Sears; New Politics; <http://newpol.org/content/queering-socialism-interview-alan-sears>

TWE: I see that issue all the time where there's a lot of new queer theory coming out, but how do you relate that back to real world experiences and everyday lives in the U.S.? How do your take that language and make it be inclusive not just to people who have those different identities that fall under queer but also for allies and those who want to work together without making it sound like if you don't have our language you can't be my ally. It’s a fine line to walk.

Sears: One of the things that will begin to change that, or solve the puzzle for us, will be when gender and sexual liberation becomes more of a movement again. When there's not a movement, one is less concerned with persuading anybody of anything, so your political terms can become more of a test of whether you have the prerequisites or not than they are terms to move and excite people. It becomes much more of an issue when you're actually trying to build a movement, and building alliances that really do matter.

I firmly believe that we in Canada have more formal rights than in the United States, and these are explicitly lesbian and gay rights: marriage, workplace benefits, and that kind of stuff. A lot of that has to do with the way the union movement in Canada from the early 1980's on really took on lesbian and gay rights. That required a whole lot of alliance building and careful work, so that when the Canadian Union of Postal Workers went on strike in 1981, they fought for both full pay for maternity leave for women and non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the workplace. That wasn't because it was primarily a queer union. It was because people did the hard alliance work in what was a very radical union, to say, “If we're radical, we need to defend the rights of women, the rights of gays and lesbians, and so on.”

Andrew Sernatinger (AS): That's a good transition because I was going to ask about some of your work where you've written about how gender and sexual identities develop and change in capitalism, and how that has a lot to do with how capitalist work is organized. I was hoping you could run this through because it's a very interesting idea and it's a meeting place of Marxist ideas and queer theory. It strikes me as being really different because there's a mantra that “gay has always existed throughout history,” and now we're arriving at a new place where it can finally just come out. But you're saying something a little more nuanced...

Sears: The idea of the eternal, unchanging “gay” is partly a product of attempting to use human rights legislation—and that part of it makes sense. I think you have to use every tool you can to fight discrimination while building movements to overturn the system. But in doing that the claim became, “it's not a choice at all, we're born this way.” Somehow that should mean we have intrinsic rights, as though if there was any choice at all we'd be outside the realm of intrinsic rights and thus outside of court challenges and so on. But it's a really dubious political distinction: that it's only what you're born with that gives you rights as opposed to choices you make in your life.

It is also a really bad anthropology and a very undynamic view of human sexuality. What we would now call “heterosexuality,” which is only a term that arose in the 1800's, has also changed over time. All kinds of arrangements existed over time, so the idea that at the heart of it was the essential heterosexual or essential homosexual that go unchanged, until finally we've earned the right to express our various sexualities in modern North America, seems to me to be pretty wrong-headed to begin with.

The best works on this, which I first found through John D'Emelio and Barry Adam, basically asked, “What began to change?” since the term “homosexual” was only coined in the 1860's. Why didn't they need a word before? There were certainly same-sex practices. Huge varieties of human societies have had same-sex practices that have taken all kinds of forms. But the “homosexual,” which is kind of the “full-timer,” the dedicated, unvarying same-sex practitioner, only arose as a word in the 1860's, and that's not bashfulness, but it tells us that that full-timers really didn't exist very much up until then.

What made that possible? There were lots of same-sex practices, but the idea that one has a primary orientation towards your own gender or towards another one became possible largely with the rise of capitalism and the separation of work and home life. The relationships in which you keep yourself alive, sustain new life, take care of your emotional needs, wash yourself, rest yourself—those relationships are different in capitalist society for most of us than our working relationship, where we earn the money to make the rest of that possible. Most of us go out to work and then come home. Once that happened, the relationships at home can take a whole bunch of different forms. There is a certain kind of space created for exploration that would not have been possible before.

The basic capitalist structure created new kinds of possibilities. And a range of different people, including Foucault but also Marxists have looked at the rise of sexuality specifically in this context. Foucault looks much less at the capitalist character of it, but they look at that separation of work and home.

Now, from the point of view of governments and state-policy makers, this was a bad thing. In England in the 1840's and 50's, there were all these “Condition of the Working Class” reports, where state officials went into so-called slums and were very worried with what they thought of as amorality among working people. So then you began to get, from the point of view of capitalist states, a whole new direction, which was to ban homosexuality and regulate sexuality and gender behavior through schools and so on. In the 1880's, you get male-homosexuality outlawed in Britain, and in Canada, which was following Britain. Not women's same-sex practices, or lesbianism; it wasn't outlawed basically because Parliament would not admit that women had enough of a sexuality to be sexual with each other. It wasn't a positive measure, but a total denial of women's sexual agency at all. The rise of capitalism created certain possibilities but also, from the point of view of the state, different kinds of constraints.

AS: Thinking about it through the twentieth century and linking it back to today, it seems like one of the major markers that starts to distinguish the gay rights movement, and then the mark between gay and queer, is the Post-War Accord and the change of the family structure. Maybe you could run that through for us?

Sears: What happens with the end of World War II and the development of new social systems is that you began to get the stabilization in new ways of particular family forms within layers of the working class -- though the Post-War Accord didn't include everyone.

That at first was incredibly gender-normative. There was a kind of gender panic after World War II, where large numbers of women had been involved in paid labor. After that there was a period of incredible repression. In Canada, that took the form of a purge of basically anyone who they identified as gay or lesbian from the civil service. The idea was that people who are homosexual are more likely to be black-mailed by the Russians, and thus in a Cold War era are a threat to national security. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the police force who did the major security work in Canada like the FBI does in the States, actually tried to invent a “fruit machine” that would identify gay civil servants so they could be fired.

The first impact of the post-war period was an attempt to force a heterosexual normative family form, and to use the increased income, assistance, and social security that working people had won to try and create a very specific model of the family within sections of the working class: disproportionately among white folks. Then, beginning with the women's liberation movement, people began to refuse that—not that there wasn't resistance along the way, but in the 1960's women quite assertively mobilized around these things and began to demand a change in the way this post-war stabilization was affecting the family form. Feminism, the rise of the women's movement, and the beginning of the Black Power movement, began to create models and new ways of thinking so that gays actually began to identify what they were facing as a political oppression, which a very small number of political gays had done before that. Most communities' people just thought that this is the way it is. Then it became politicized by a movement that fought against the dominant normative form that developed after the war.

There's some opening up in the family form, but at the same time not breaking the bounds of capitalism that began to have huge influences on what ultimately got achieved by that movement. It's much more about coupledom than it is about liberation; about couples' rights rather than sexual liberation in any sort of way. The whole movement became so defined by purchasing and lifestyle and so on that capitalism has had its influences on this end as well.

TWE: It's interesting where you ended that because I did want to talk about the commercialization of gay and lesbian identity. During Pride Month, part of me is excited as a queer person to celebrate that, but then I go to events and I see corporation after corporation and the message of “Buy Gay Things” as a way to prove your gay identity. Could you go into how capitalism changed to commodify gay identity while it's still silent on the rights? How can capitalism change to adapt while still exclude the vast majority of gay or queer people?

Sears: In terms of a new low for Pride in Toronto, this year the Executive Director for Pride Toronto, which is one of the three biggest in North America, opened the Toronto Stock Exchange with all kinds of Pride signs, ringing the bell. It really was a sign of where things have come.

I was at a couple of the early Pride Marches in Toronto, and it was scary. It's hard to imagine now what it was like to feel that there's a good chance that you're going to get attacked, people throw things, you are being exposed to a lot of contempt and there's very few of you. It felt pretty daunting at the time. Anything except for a mass march did at the time. So to see the change from these scary little gatherings to this festival with streets lined across the Toronto community is shocking. In a way there's excitement with that: I do think that even though queer bashing continues, and we have to be clear that the violence hasn't gone away and that people are still afraid, there are changes that are important that need to be celebrated.

But the question needs to be asked at some point, why is it that we made gains at a time when in fact most movements seeking change were pushed backward? Affirmative action, abortion rights, and migrants were hugely under attack and being brutalized; unions are being attacked and workers are giving up all kinds of gains; general labor law is going backwards. Why is it that we've made advances? Some of it is because people fought, that does make a difference that people were defiant, and angry, and mobilized. But what we gained, and it's only in retrospect that you see it, is largely what was most compatible with capitalism.

Of all the things we were fighting for, there was the idea of generally opening up gender and sexuality in real ways, so that people would have realms of play, both in the engineering sense and in the creative unalienated activity sense. Instead what happened was that we won the rights that were most compatible: coupledom, where marriage is becoming officially monogamous, certain workplace benefits (which make a huge difference and should be fought for), but also this idea that we mark ourselves by the consumption of very specific commodities. You see that in terms of clothing and hairstyles, going to certain places. That cuts out people with low-income; they can't be visibly queer. Often people of color are excluded because the character of that commercialization has whiteness built into it, often in fairly clear ways. It seems like we've won a lot, and then you realize that what we've won is the relatively easy stuff that fits with this system. In fact, it risks dividing ourselves much more and potentially limits what we can gain.

TWE: Chelsea Manning (at the time referred to as Bradley) was going to be one of the honorary grand marshals at the Pride Parade in San Francisco this year; then they decided to cut Manning from the line-up. I thought that was interesting to show how nervous people are about the Pride Parade's receptions, and the unwillingness to engage with other controversial issues that connect with gay and queer issues, such as military resisters or antiwar movements—keeping those as separate things from “gay rights.”

Sears: Earlier you referred to alliance building. You can build radical alliances for change with other people who are facing deep exclusion and oppression, or you can try to build alliances with essentially elements of the mainstream ruling order, with Democratic or Republican politicians, to try and become an insider. That's a different kind of alliance-building than the kind we were referring to before, but it's unfortunately what the main body of the movement has gone for, insofar as the term movement can even apply. That means you don't want to do anything that would offend corporate bosses, mayors, Democratic politicians, and so on. You end up pushing out anything that's controversial.

To their credit, Toronto Pride hasn't pushed out Queers Against Israeli Apartheid (QAIA) despite the fact that the City Council has threatened to defund Pride if QAIA, opposed to Israeli pink-washing, marches on Pride day. They've marched each time, and Pride has stuck with their right to march and City Hall has backed off. Occasionally some guts are still shown, but overall it's all about showing yourself off to those who you want to see you as allies, who are sadly the most powerful and that means massive compromise.

TWE: Here in the States, there's been a lot of gearing up around marriage equality and getting laws passed state-by-state. I've been to a lot of meetings, like Occupy last year, where people were having a lot of discussions about marriage equality. The issue that always came up was healthcare, and I would go and talk about the need for healthcare for everyone (single-payer), so I really appreciate you pointing out that instead we're winning rights to coupledom. The issue I saw coming out of the AIDS movement was the fight for healthcare and not just for marriage.

Sears: I agree completely. Personally, I believe we should always oppose legal discrimination; therefore I support marriage rights only because it ends the heterosexual monopoly. The other side of it is the cost of focusing explicitly on marriage rights. If it's only about workplace benefits for a limited portion of the population, there are a lot of queers, or just couples, who don't benefit from that because they're working in situations where they don't have benefits. That's true of a lot of the workforce now.

Remember that we are not fighting for couple rights, but universal rights ultimately, rights that should apply to anybody. We're a little bit closer to that in Canada than in the United States because of single-payer health care. Part of what's remarkable in the differences between the two countries is that it was easier for unions in Canada to win same-sex workplace benefits for unmarried gay couple simply because the cost of healthcare in the U.S. means that employers hate adding to the family.

The basic thing is that it's about healthcare, it's not about couples, but it's also about sexual freedom! That means different things to different people. That may mean couples, that may mean having sex with a lot of people; different people have different preferences and needs. If we are talking about sexual liberation, we're talking about the idea that as long as everyone is consenting, people should have the right to do those things. In general, there's shame that exists in this society about sexuality, where people can't even talk to their partners about what they want to do or what they don't want to do. Images of sexuality are everywhere, every billboard, every car ad, and yet in reality people are incredibly silenced about their sexualities, about what they want and need. There's some locker-room bravado that some men have, but that's not really sexuality, it's bragging about conquest.

We've made some gains, but we haven't really achieved some of the most basic things around sexual openness, non-stigma, and choices.

AS: One of the reasons we wanted to do this interview is that we wanted to push-back against some of the guiding wisdom in the socialist movement, which seems very hesitant about queer politics. Now people are against a lot of concepts that came through queer theory: the word queer, notions of privilege, and a lot of the more challenging concepts that are not as clearly delineated in Marxist theory. It seems like there is a kind of tension about sexuality with Marxists, but it's something I hope will change. Maybe you could comment on that, and what your experience has been in this area.

Sears: I recently was reading a book by Sheila Rowbotham about “utopian socialists.” They were people in the 1800's who considered themselves socialists and had great aspirations for what a better world would be like. It's clear that many of them, especially women but also some men, were thinking about sexual politics as part of what we would now call the liberation struggle. Some of them were thinking explicitly around same-sex practices, but a lot of them were thinking about what real sexual freedom would mean.

That strain of utopian socialism gradually got pushed out through the twentieth century by Marxism within the socialist movement. Even though there were some places where Marxism and sexual liberation found new meeting places, overall there was a lot of interpretation of Marxism in terms of economic categories: class, the workplace. You'll find a lot of Marxists to this day who talk obsessively about the power that workers have at the point of production, meaning in the workplace -- it's true that is an important source of power and I'm not trying to deny the power of a general strike. But if our politics only focus on the workplace, it's a place where sexuality is largely excluded.

At the very best, the better end of Marxism has tended to adopt and work out the best ideas liberals have about sexual freedom. Through the twentieth century, certainly in my period as a socialist and queer activist, my view looking back on the record of a socialist-queer movement was that it was largely picking up the best knowledge of the liberal-left of the existing movement and putting out a liberal political practice. I think one of the things that we've learned from the queer movement is that that's not good enough. There are all kinds of people who are left out of that. We need to be on the leading edge of those who are asking the tough questions about who's left out and why, and what do we do about that? How does “gay” work with patterns of racialization—it's not an accident that white folks tend to come out more, it actually has to do with the whole definition of who counts as gay or lesbian and how that works culturally, racially.

Marxism, or socialism in its broad sense, provides tools for thinking about all this. If the separation of work and home is part of the way “gay” begins to exist as a category, what does it tell us about this category? There are all kinds of questions we can look into, like, “Why is the workplace so gender-normative?” “Why do particular kinds of workplaces run around a very explicit kind of masculinity?” It's not simply that “those guys are like that” -- so what are the dynamics of the workplace that operate to create gendered behavior in certain ways and then police it?

If we're talking about liberation, how do we begin to address that part of sexual freedom that is having a place to have sex? That means we should be deeply concerned about homelessness. We should also be concerned about young people who often have no space as they're becoming sexually active and end up having their sexuality in the cracks. As long as we, as socialists, don't think that our tools are exclusive, as long as we're engaging with queer theories, with anti-racist theories, with feminist theories, there's a lot we can do.

This gets to what real freedom looks like. Marx's ideas about alienation and un-alienation, the idea that humans thrive by making our mark on the world, are tools that can be helpful in offering a vision of gender and sexual liberation that begins to ask questions about why the gender system persists, why sexuality occurs only in the cracks; what is it about work that is a rejection of hedonism, work as duty, the squeezing out of the joyful aspects of life. That means challenging the kind of socialism that's often there in organizations: “All work and no play makes socialism a dull boy.” A lot of the focus on the workplace and the economy, as if capitalism exists simply as a set of economic relations and not also as a set of cultural and interpersonal relations, that kind of socialism is heading towards a dead-end. Part of the revitalization, building the next-New Left, will be restoring the excitement: what would revolution really bring about?

TWE: How do you see socialism and queer activism partnering up, and where can those be providing strengths for each other so that we can start to move forward?

Sears: The more that I've thought about this, the more I've come to believe that the best socialist thinking in all areas is hybrid thinking. It's not purely “socialist,” but involves deep engagement with the theories, thoughts, and actions of those involved in struggles and how the world appears to them. “Queering” socialism offers opportunities, not only in the realm of gender and sexual liberation, but also in terms of approaches to work and all areas of life.

In queer theory right now, there's a lot of talk about queers as transgressors: we act up against the dominant set of sexual relations, which is non-queer. But permanent transgression is kind of unsatisfying, and socialism can help us move from transgression to transformation. The goal is to change the whole set of relations to a new realm of freedom, and then we wouldn't even know what queer would look like anymore.

Together, queers, socialists and anti-racists can begin to ask questions about how it is that the idea of “gay” is now being used globally as part of a western imperialist power strategy. How did that happen? What is it about “gay” that is exclusionary? How is it that all kinds of other same-sex practices in the world don't count, or are seen as a lesser-form, a not-yet-out form of sexuality, and a particular kind of self-proclaimed gay and lesbianness that has tended to occur among certain layers of disproportionately white folks in Europe and North America. Socialism provides some of the tools, but not all of them.

What about this joyous, challenging, gutsy liberation movement, that when I first came into politics was just fun: dirty, nasty, celebratory, fun. How do we bring the ethos of that kind of movement into socialism? If we can do that, we'll have a way more potent set of tools, because it won't just be about the dull duty, and not about disapproving of everyone else and their crimes and political deviations, but talking about where we're heading and the incredible celebration of human potential: what we could be, the way we could be living, the stuff you see in every human being that gets crushed out of them. When you get together the queer, the socialist, the anti-racist, then you start to point to what it all could begin to look like.

### Link

#### “Consensual sex work” is an oxymoron---money is a coercive force which renders consent impossible---it’s not one dimensional

**Moran and Farley 19** , Journalism degree from Dublin City University, founding member of SPACE international. PhD in Counseling Psychology from the University of Iowa. (Rachel and Melissa, 2/5/2019, “Consent, Coercion, and Culpability: Is Prostitution Stigmatized Work or an Exploitive and Violent Practice Rooted in Sex, Race, and Class Inequality?” *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-018-1371-8> Date Accessed: 4/8/2022)

Coercion Ne’Cole Moore, a member of SPACE International5 noted: Something to consider: most of us who have been in the “Life” have experienced early sexual assault, have come from dysfunctional family systems, were in the system, i.e., foster care and juvenile justice. Had inadequate support and supervision, and exposed to violence. People don’t have to be chained up to be trapped in prostitution. Fraud, force, and coercion. Because pimps use various tactics to control a woman or child (Moore, 2016). Prostituted sex is coerced sex by its nature. The cash is the coercive force. If we think about the scenario of a loaded gun pointed at somebody, we will have no problem identifying that gun as an instrument of coercion. Because of the capitalist structure of our world, which surrounds us with the reality of money in everything we see, do, and experience, we have a great deal more trouble identifying cash as a coercive force, but that is exactly what cash is. This is not an indictment of capitalism necessarily; there is a very great deal of diference between coercing someone to make a sandwich and coercing them to bend over and tolerate unwanted sex. Unwanted sex in every other conceivable scenario is identifed as sexually abusive. It is only in prostitution that the abusive nature of the sex is denied, and it is denied because the coercion itself is not identifed. Prostitution will never be recognized as sexual abuse until the cash transaction integral to it is identifed as coercive by its nature. Further to this, we must look behind the cash at the willful intention of the person using it as a means of coercion, because coercion is a chain that starts with human intention. In prostitution, men are well aware that the sex involved is unwanted, that it must be coerced with cash before the woman will capitulate to it. The physical act of handing over cash is evidence in itself of the understanding that the sexual situation wouldn’t otherwise happen; it is evidence of the intentional nature of the coercion. The coercion is designed to create capitulation. When we bring any form of force to bear in order to create sexual capitulation, that capitulation is not to be confused with sexual consent. The “consent” here is not to have sex, but to tolerate it. This reality removes prostituted sex from the realm of sex that could even be considered consensual, because coercion itself renders sexual consent impossible.

#### Our history of indigenous sex workers isn’t essentialist—affirmation of “consent” and “agency” are the EXCEPTION, NOT THE RULE—emphasizing the exploitative history of Native women despite other complexities is key to avoid erasing these legacies

Deer 10 – Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law (Sarah, “Relocation Revisited: Sex Trafficking of Native Women in the United States,” 36 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 621, accessed 12-26-14 //Bosley)

Sexual violence perpetrated by European men represented the earliest form of institutionalized and officially sanctioned "sexual slavery" in the Western hemisphere. In many instances, Indian men were killed in battle, but the women and children were taken captive by the Europeans and used for sex, labor, or profit. Most historians agree that this behavior was one-sided. Native peoples had little to no interest in sexual conquest of European women. n122 Townsend notes: "The stories [of European captives] never went the other way around: later, when [European] women settlers went along, there emerged no tales of Spanish or English women being met by welcoming Indian chiefs who courted their favors." n123 A commentator on King Philip's War, for example, noted that Indians did not commit "any uncivil Carriage to any of the Females, nor ever attempted the chastity of any of them." n124 A number of additional commentators came to the same conclusion in the next century. William Douglass, James Clinton, and William Martin all published accounts, which include noteworthy narratives about the so-called "restraint" of Indians in regards to white [\*646] women. n125 Liberated white female captives themselves noted that the Indians did not sexually violate them. n126 In fact, many commentators who knew Indian people quite well acknowledged that sexual mistreatment of any females - including captives - was considered criminal behavior by the tribes. n127 Unlike the English, the Indians were rarely convicted of sexual misdeeds such as fornication or adultery, or accused of siring illegitimate children. More serious sexual crimes such as rape were equally rare among the Indians. In fact, while the cases relating to sexual misdemeanors make up only a small percentage of the crimes of which the Indians were accused, similar crimes amount to almost half of those reported for the English. n128 Because sexual predation was not commonplace prior to contact, the evidence supports the conclusion that widespread, systemic sex slavery for profit was not present in the Americas after the arrival of Europeans. Not all sexual activity between Native women and white men constituted sexual exploitation. Certainly there were thousands upon thousands of consensual sexual and romantic relationships between Native women and white men from the early days of contact. These [\*647] non-coercive relationships, where they existed, were arguably atypical of the experience of most Native women. n129 Although it is important to acknowledge the existence of these consensual relationships, they were the exception, not the rule. Even with consensual relationships, caution must be exercised in reconstructing the social dynamics between Native women and white men. The relationships between French fur traders and Native women, for example, were incredibly complex and quite different from the experience of women enslaved by the Spanish and English. Historical accounts indicate that white men who appeared to have entered into consensual relationships with Native women were labeled deviant by greater European society. Even the terms that were used to describe such men (such as the pejorative "squaw man") reflected the disdain with which European-American society viewed even consensual sex with Indians. Calloway explains that "of all the marginal peoples that emerged on the frontier, renegades [white men in relationships with Native women] aroused the most fear and loathing." n130 This loathing was probably tied to a perspective that Native women (and those who associated with them) were fundamentally unclean as well as more general European perspective that interracial relationships ("race-mixing") was unnatural. Most historians who acknowledge the tribal experience often focus on the deviant white male - little attention has been paid by historians to the Native woman who may or may not have consented to the relationship. Historian Juliana Barr explains: In seeking to redeem the humanity of these women and to recognize the important roles they had to play in trade, diplomacy, and war, scholars have often conflated agency with choice, independent will, or resistance and, in the process, have lost sight of the powerlessness, objectification, and suffering that defined the exigencies of many of these women's lives. n131

### Escalante

#### The narrative form regardless of content prevents liberation

Robinson 97, Professor of Law, City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law. (Ruthann, Beginning From (My) Experience: The Paradoxes of Lesbian/Queer Narrativities, HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1289&context=cl\_pubs&httpsredir=1&referer=)

First, it may be paradoxical-and unworkable-to use narrative to advance lesbian/queer liberation because narrative itself may be inescapably male and heterosexual. For those theorists who rely upon psychoanalytic models of narrative as equatable to desire, this desire is constructed as male. As Teresa de Lauretis notes, it is male desire that structures narrativity and results in its singular plot: the male hero's quest which has a woman as the reward/object. 27 The heterosexuality of this model is made more explicit by lesbian theorist Judith Roof, who argues that "our very understanding of narrative as a primary means to sense and satisfaction depends upon a metaphorically heterosexual dynamic within a reproductive aegis."" 2 Roof is not arguing that there cannot be narratives with lesbian content, or even narratives with "positive" lesbian content, but rather that the structure of narrative is ineluctably male and heterosexual. This may explain some of the dissatisfaction with the revolutionary potential of lesbian/queer narratives, 129 even when such narratives seek to disrupt sex or gender categories. 30 As Roof states: "Something in the way we understand what a story is in the first place or something in the way narrative itself operates produces narrative's 'heterosexually friendly' shape."' While not invoking objections of masculinity or heterosexuality, Fredric Jameson's analysis of the "commodification" of narrative is pertinent.' In Jameson's analysis, narrative's arrangement into beginning-middle-end is a reifying and consumptive structure whereby the end determines every portion of the narrative, which portions are themselves consumed under the narrative beginning-middle-end model.' 34 If Roof is correct in her assertion that narrativity only tolerates lesbianism in its perverse middle,'35 then Jameson's insight about the relative irrelevance of every aspect other than the end means that lesbians can exist as consumable objects within narrative but that our existence cannot be narrativity's end/purpose. Thus, although we may believe that narrative is preferable to doctrinal rules for accomplishing favorable legal change for lesbians and other queers, it may be that narrative is as male and heterosexual a structure as rationalist legalism.

#### The structure of narrative prevents it from being a means of liberation

Robinson 97, Professor of Law, City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law. (Ruthann, Beginning From (My) Experience: The Paradoxes of Lesbian/Queer Narrativities, HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1289&context=cl\_pubs&httpsredir=1&referer=)

2. A second and related paradox is that the oppositional stance of narrative may not be oppositional at all. Barthes has famously stated that "narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life itself." 13 Similarly, Hayden White has stated that to even "raise the question of narrative itself is to invite reflection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself." 137 By using narratives, we often believe we are presenting a specific account as distinct from an abstract theory, but the very structure of narrative may be undermining its content, no matter how distinctive. As Judith Roof argues, narrative "is a structural defense against a chaotic world"1 3 ' and in its attempt to impose order it may be more like a logical system than not. The beginning-middle-end structure of narrative is the same structure employed in Enlightenment and modernist pursuits of history, economics, science, and law. For example, one of Hegel's central notions was that "history is the story of the development of human freedom." 139 This development is inextricably bound to law and the formation of the nation-state, which in fact enables the conditions for narrativity. As Robert Weisberg explicates Hegel's view: Only where there is law can there be a subject or kind of event that lends itself to narrative, or a legal subject to serve as the agent, agency, and subject of historical narrative. The urge to tell stories derives either from a desire for national law and order or a desire to challenge that law and order .... Hence, narrative deals with law, legality, legitimacy, or more generally authority. The desire to narrate is the desire to represent authority, whose legitimacy depends on establishing certain grounding facts.140 Such philosophizing, indeed all of Hegel's philosophizing, typifies the grand narrative or metanarrative that postmodernism rejects. 141 Postmodernism's rejection, however, does not encompass "smaller" narratives, which are often celebrated as a method to oppose scientific, abstract, or even legal systems. 42 Yet these smaller narratives-by being narratives-replicate the structure of the grand narratives being rejected, albeit on a smaller scale: my afternoon at a lesbian bar is substituted for the global human struggle toward freedom. Yet even my small story of my afternoon at a lesbian bar requires me to "emplot the events according to the principles informing the structures of distinctive story types or genres." 143 This so called emplotment-structuring the events with a beginning, middle, and end-will occur whether I later write the afternoon as a fictional scene, whether I later "truthfully" narrate "what I did today" to my lover, or perhaps even as I remain silent but simply understand/remember that specific afternoon at that specific bar. What I am suggesting is that it may be the very act of emplotment, the narrativizing itself, that is problematic, rather than simply the scale or subject of the narrative. Just as narrative seems transhistorical, transcultural, and even "natural," so too does domination and subjection. What if there is a link between the structures of narrative and the structures of domination? In other words, what if a condition of lesbian emancipation is a state without a necessary end? Or as Roof expresses it, a rejection of narrative may allow us to understand what has always been there but which we have left uncounted because it did not lead to "closure or production. " " Or perhaps even more radical, what if the condition of lesbian/queer emancipation is a state without any end? If "[e]very story is over before it begins" because narratives "report a completed past they cannot alter," 45 then lesbian/queer liberation in the here-and-now may demand a rejection of narrative.

### Alternative

#### Their author calls for reform to capitalist institutional structures

Griffin 15, Penny Griffin is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, (crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective, Feminist Review , 2015, No. 109, the politics of austerity (2015), pp. 49-72 : <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24571874>)

conclusion(s)This paper has argued that the discourses of financial crisis that have emerged in recent years, and that have contributed to the longevity of neo-liberal, capitalist imperatives in the global political economy, are gendered. Asserting that the origins and future trajectory of contemporary global finance depend upon gendered foundations, this paper has illustrated how the dismissal of feminist critique and the reproduction of a stylised and trivialised form of feminism in ‘crisis governance feminism’ have enabled existing structures and mechanisms of gendered financial privilege to suppress calls for their overhaul and to re-entrench global finance as the preserve of neo-liberal, masculine power in the global political economy. By proposing a discursive analysis of crisis governance, this paper has built on and sought to extend existing feminist critiques to focus on how crisis can be understood as a mechanism of contemporary, everyday governance, dependent on

two key discursive elements: the dismissal of prickly feminist critique, particularly of the impacts of financial crises on women and the social costs of austerity measures, and the co-optation and promotion of ‘appropriate’ feminist ideas, enabling a discourse of crisis governance that draws upon, but ultimately trivialises, key feminist concerns. These discursive components of crisis governance constitute what this paper argues are neo-liberalism’s gendered techniques of crisis governance, facilitating ‘effective’ crisis management while censoring challenges to the hierarchies, shock tactics and austerity measures on which crisis governance depends for its smooth operation. Despite, then, some integration of ostensibly feminist concerns and a greater attention to gender since 2008, global finance remains predicated upon a masculinised, white and elitist culture of privilege. Feminist scholarship has deconstructed the form and function of measures of gender equality in governance, including diversity ‘management’ and quota systems, and their significance in resuscitating capitalist imperatives. Feminists continue to voice concerns around the co-optation and path of feminist knowledge, including the corporatisation of development policy-making and practice and the rise of transnational business feminism. Gender’s appearance as an everyday technique of global governance presents feminist analysis, however, with tricky questions and ambiguous rejoinders. The question remains as to whether feminists can resist the co-optation of feminist knowledge while working with neo-liberal institutions, actors and policies to keep gender considerations at hand across discourses of governance. Feminists are acutely aware of the costs of the pursuit of austerity that have left neo-liberalism, and its advocates, on the defensive in recent years. While placing gender firmly and prominently on the agenda of global governance legitimates ‘a focus on gender issues within state and nonstate arenas and within international organisations’(Elias, 2013: 166), the instrumentalisation and essentialisation of gender, correlating women’s empowerment and gender equality in governance discourse with economic growth and competitiveness, ‘disappears’ key feminist concerns, including the entrenchment of inequality, discrimination and violence in the global political economy. Governance initiatives that reproduce women’s ‘naturally’ more responsible tendencies are exercises in selective fact telling, distorting the power that economic orders wield over social lives and constraining the possibilities, and space, for contestation and critique. While contemporary governance actors and organisations have grasped that at least some feminist concerns have policy traction, the lack of systemic reform and structural revisioning ‘post’-crisis has meant only that the ‘global financial crisis’ continues to engender policy that reproduces the masculinised, white and elitist culture of financial privilege on which global finance has been built. Whether we can reasonably expect a culture (organisational or otherwise) predicated on gendered and racist privilege to create solutions not infected with the hierarchies and discriminations of that privilege remains open to debate. As Enloe (2013: 52) suggests, where internal cultures of violent and exclusive masculinity are enabled to survive and prosper, the prospects for policy decision-making and action that are not violent and exclusive are uncertain. Feminist research has been opposed for the longest time to the principle of ‘enough’: that any policy, idea or strategy of implementation is enough alone to rewrite inequality. Feminism does not lose its credibility because of its association with governance until feminists start making policies that injure people: this happens only when feminists stop thinking broadly about the nature of their work or are unable, or unwilling, to challenge the wider structures that contain them. Feminists do not often think that the introduction of a quota strategy means that the battle has been won, but the actors and institutions that implement it might very well believe this to be enough. The task for feminism and its troubled relationship with governance is, in this regard, not the abandonment of existing methods and mechanisms, but a continually sharpened critique, an attentiveness to suffering, within and without, that undoes governance feminism’s blindness to the injustices it might perpetuate.

# 1NR

## Case

### 1NC — 3

#### Finishing

Duggan and Munoz 10, Lisa Duggan is a Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis at New York University, and Jose Estaban Munoz is an associate professor and department chair of performance studies at New York University, “Hope and hopelessness: A dialogue”, chapter (pages 281-283) “Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory”, [2/20/2020], <https://doi.org/10.1080/07407700903064946> /EH

Lisa: Indeed. Hope is a risk. But I worry that we understate the full effects and meaning of that little word, risk. The hope we invest in our experimental forms, when bad sentiments lead us out of the ossified structures that constrain us, offers us no guarantee. Our experimental forms fail. We experiment under the conditions of life now – the material conditions of housing, health care and work and the emotional conditions of our own past and present intimacies created and broken. How do we transform and escape the conditions of neoliberal privatization and our own ‘‘family’’ histories? What happens to educated hope and concrete utopian thinking when we discover we’ve fucked up, we’ve been wrong, we’ve failed to cope with what we must deal with? What happens when we take the risk of hope and land flat on our faces, alone, abandoned and lost? Especially those of us who seek meaningful work outside the corporate form, or live beyond the limits of the normative couple? Those among us who forsake ossified modes of security, or who simply cannot enlist them for ourselves, take terrifying risks every day. Bad sentiments, pursued as escape, can lead to isolation, poverty and death. So there is fear attached to hope – hope understood as a risky reaching out for something else that will fail, in some if not all ways. What are the resources, then, for an educated hope that comprehends inherent risk and fear? What are the most reliable building blocks for, and the sturdiest bridges to, concrete utopias? I think these might be found in modes of expansive sociality that generate energy from shared collectivity. Expansive, innovative socialities produce energy for alternative, cooperative economies and participatory politics – because as we know, these can be exhausting even if not defined as ‘‘work.’’ Particularly as a basis for queer hope, loving, fucking and socializing otherwise constitute a practice that moves us toward Feeling Revolutionary, in our economic and political as well as (overlapping) intimate lives. Surely gay respectability politics and the sentimentality of the citizen who only wants to be ‘‘good,’’ now dominant on the US political landscape, do not lead us anywhere else, but only into the moribund institutions that deaden the body politic (marriage, the military). So bad sentiments can lead us (instead) out of dominant, alienating social forms, like alienated labor and the gendered family, and into a collectivity of the cynical, bitter, hostile, despairing and hopeless. This is how I find my people! Can these communities of the politically embittered then lead us, not necessarily down the slippery slope to entropy, but into a generatively energetic revolutionary force? Well, can they? If we cling to what Melanie Klein calls the paranoid schizoid position, perhaps not (see Klein 1975). In that infantile place, we reject the bad breast/world for frustrating us and cling to our impossible wishes for oral/political fulfillment, delivered under conditions we can control. One way of grasping the basis for embittered community is to see it as the political solidarity of the paranoid schizoid. And that’s not a bad thing. Regression to infantile intensities and demands can be vitalizing, can help us throw off the moribund maturities demanded by conventional social forms. Such regressions can operate as queer temporalities of anti-development and refusals of normative, Oedipal maturity. The paranoid schizoid pleasures can be considerable, and productive. But they can also lead to forms of anti-relationality, to anti-sociality, to queer refusals that go nowhere else in the world. Klein’s depressive position, if understood not as an achievement of developmental maturity, but as a sideways move out of an impasse (thank you to Kathryn Stockton), can lead (perhaps) to educated hope, to concrete utopia within the social realm.4 From the depressive position we accept the uncontrollable nature of political reality, we critique the social world but still engage it, we take the risk of hope with full knowledge of the possibility, even the certainty, of failure. We repair our relation to the social and political world that we have also wished to mutilate, explode, destroy. We campaign for Obama, then organize to pressure and transform the political institutions that disappoint or harm us. It hurts me to write a sentence as conventional as the previous one, as if I were an advocate of Rorty-style pragmatism, when my Facebook page describes me as an anti-normotic anarcho-socialist! This is the point at which I find the sideways move so crucial. Queer vitality, Feeling Revolutionary, may require that we straddle the Kleinian paranoid schizoid and depressive positions, escaping and re-entering the scene of educated hope in a contrapuntal dance, moving always sideways, never growing ‘‘up.’’ Can we summarize so far by simply and clearly pointing out that the neoliberal state and economy organize compulsory sociality through alienating institutions of work and politics? Noting that the related institutions of marriage and the family organize intimacy and sociality into domesticity and competitive consumption by regulating and constraining our intimate and social energies. Breaking out requires negative energetic force. That force threatens isolation, pain, poverty, prison and death, and it can also lock an embittered community into a romanticized embrace of the negative, a version of the paranoid schizoid position, producing (among other things) versions of what has been called the queer anti-social thesis.5 But that force can also lay the basis for a sideways step into political engagement

[marked]

in a disappointing world, via the educated hope, the concrete utopia, about which Jose´ has been so eloquent. This all leads me to postulate that hope and hopelessness exist in a dialectical rather than oppositional relation, and that the opposite of hope is complacency – a form of happiness that will not risk the consequences of its own suppressed hostility and pain.6 And complacency is the affect of homonormativity. Engaged anti-normative left queer politics is powered by the pleasures of bitterness, cynicism and pain, as well as by ecstasy, empathy and solidarity. But it gestures always necessarily through hope to the concrete utopias forged in our experimental intimacies and social forms. Hope is the primary way we bring ourselves to take the risk of breaking out of the constraints of present conditions. Hope is the energy we use to smash, not depression (grief, sadness, despair, hostility, anger and bitterness) but complacency in all its protean disguises. Jose´: When we talk about this dialectical tension between hope and hopelessness we must account for the force of the negative. But we don’t mean the negative in some grandiose subjectivity-shattering way. We mean living with the negative and that, first and foremost, means living with failure. This is to say that hopelessness and hope converge at a certain point. And we must then face reality in the form of an oftentimes disappointing world. Here is where we depart from some other queer writers and thinkers who write about abandonment to the negative and a subsequent rejection or evasion of politics. Queerness might signal a certain belonging through and with negativity. Often experimental intimacies falter. But those failures and efforts to fail have a certain value despite their ends. In this way we are calling for a politics oriented towards means and not ends. Klein described the depressive position as the only ethical one. But as Lisa indicates we cannot discount the importance of the paranoid schizoid positions and its pleasures – its negative force as an anti-normative resource for queer existence. Klein’s substitution of positions for Freud’s developmentally rigid stages lets us imagine the queer temporal choreography that Lisa describes. W.R. Bion’s notion of valence might also be useful to understand how a belonging in and through affective negativity works for an anti-normative politics (see Bion 1991). Valency, borrowed from chemistry, is the concept that describes the capacity for spontaneous and instinctive emotional combination, between two individuals or a group. Bion’s concept provides a provisional and partial account of how emotions cement social groups as guiding basic assumptions (what he calls bas). Thus as a group or a pair we share happiness and grief, ecstasy and sorrow, and so forth. This affective commonality is a site for commonality and even sociality. When we started this writing project it seemed like most folks assumed that we would be writing about ‘‘hope vs hopelessness’’ or at the very least ‘‘hope or hopelessness.’’ But as this collaborative project progressed it became clear to us that the most important word in our title was the conjunction ‘‘and.’’ Lisa began this dialogue by recounting a story a friend told her. In many ways friendship is the condition of possibility for this writing. Lisa and I share a certain emotional valency and we are part of a larger circuit of friends who also share shifting basic assumptions (for our purposes here, queer feelings). We write for and from an ‘‘and’’ in the hopes to better describe actually existing and potential queer worlds that thrive with, through and because of the negative.

### 1NC — 4

#### Zero Solvency--Griffin concludes that performance alone can’t solve-- changing institutional structures is a prerequisite to solvency

Griffin 9, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, (Penny, The everyday practices of global finance: gender and regulatory politics of ‘diversity’, International Affairs 95: 6 (2019) 1215–1233; KU Library)

Looking to the future, then, it matters whether the global financial services industry is able to take practical interventions that do not make optional the consideration of gendered business cultures, assumptions, practices, incentives, reward patterns and discriminatory effects. The future of finance, and human well-being therein, depend now more than ever on doing more than just ‘telling stories like we’ve told them before’.95 The practices and future of the diversity agenda in global finance provide a window into these stories, their longevity and the persistent failure of global finance to reconfigure its foundational masculinism. Real change in financial activities requires that financial actors take seriously the foundational, gendered myths on which global finance has been built. To change, the global financial services industry needs to stop telling the same stories in the same ways. That global finance has not yet been able to do this reveals the power of its partial and elitist cultural origins, and the reach of its exclusive and gendered theoretical and practical categorizations.